PARTHIAN EMPIRE CAME TO AN END 224 ,APRIL 28

PARTHIAN EMPIRE 

CAME TO AN END 224 ,APRIL 28

.பார்த்தியப் பேரரசு (Parthian Empire) (ஆட்சிக் காலம்; கி மு – 247 - கி பி 224), என்பதை அரசிட் பேரரசு (Arsacid Empire) என்றும் அழைப்பர். பண்டைய ஈரானின் பார்த்திய மொழி பேசும் மக்கள், ஈரானிலும், ஈராக்கிலும் அரசியல் மற்றும் நாகரீகத்தில் மிகவும் செல்வாக்குடன் விளங்கியவர்கள்.[6]

முதலாம் அராசஸ் கி மு மூன்றாம் நூற்றாண்டின் நடுவில் பாரசீகத்தின் வடகிழக்கில் உள்ள கொரசான் பெரு நிலப்பகுதிகளை ஆண்ட கிரேக்க செலுக்கியப் பேரரசிடமிருந்து கைப்பற்றி, (r. c. 171–138 BC) பார்த்தியப் பேரரசை நிறுவியவர் ஆவார். பின்னர் இராக்கின் வடமேற்கு பகுதிகளான மீடியா, மெசபடோமியா பகுதிகளையும் கிரேக்க செலுசிட் பேரரசிடமிருந்து கைப்பற்றி பேரரசை விரிவு படுத்தினார்.

பின்னர் மத்திய கிழக்கு துருக்கி முதல் ஈரான் வரை தங்கள் ஆட்சியை விரிவு படுத்தினர். மேற்கே மத்தியதரைக்கடலின் உரோம் பேரரசு முதல் கிழக்கே சீனாவின் ஹான் பேரரசு வரை செல்லும் பட்டுப் பாதையில் அமைந்த பார்த்திய பேரரசு வணிகம் மற்றும் பொருளாதார மையமாக விளங்கியது.பார்த்திய பேரரசின் பரப்பளவு
பார்த்தியப் பேரரசில் தற்போதைய ஈரான், ஆர்மீனியா, ஈராக், ஜார்ஜியா, கிழக்கு துருக்கி, கிழக்கு சிரியா, அசர்பைஜான், துர்க்மெனிஸ்தான், ஆஃப்கானிஸ்தான், பாகிஸ்தான், குவைத், பாரசீக வளைகுடா, சவுதி அரேபியாக் கடற்கரை, பஹ்ரைன், கத்தார், ஐக்கிய அரபு அமீரகம் ஆகிய நாடுகளைக் கொண்டது.

சமூகம் & பண்பாடு

பார்த்தியக் குதிரை வீரன்
கிரேக்க செலுசிட் பேரரசின் பண்பாடும், நாகரீகமும் பரவிய பார்த்தியப் பேரரசில், கிரேக்க பண்பாட்டின் தாக்கத்தால் மறுமலர்ச்சி பெற்ற பாரசீக பண்பாடு மற்றும் நாகரீகத்தை மக்கள் விரும்பி ஏற்றனர்.

கிரேக்கர்களை பின்பற்றி பார்த்தியப் பேரரசர்கள் தங்கள் உருவம் பதித்த நாணயங்களை வெளியிட்டனர்.


வெண் களிமண்னால் மனிதத் தலை வடிவில் செய்யப்பட்ட நீர் வைக்கும் பாத்திரம்; காலம்- கி மு 1 - 2-ஆம் நூற்றாண்டு

சமயங்கள்
பல்வேறு மொழி, பண்பாடு, நாகரீகங்கள் கொண்ட பார்த்தியப் பேரரசில் பல தெய்வ வழிபாடுகள் கொண்ட கிரேக்க சமயங்களும்; சரத்துஸ்திர சமயம், யூத சமயம், மானி சமயம், பௌத்தம் மற்றும் பாபிலோனிய சமயங்கள் மக்கள் பின்பற்றினர்.

கலை மற்றும் இலக்கியம்







பண்டைய ஹாத்ரா, தற்கால ஈராக், கட்டிய ஆண்டு; கி பி 50

பார்த்திய கலைகள், பிரதேசம் மற்றும் வரலாறு வாரியாக பாரசீகம், மெசபடோமியா மற்றும் பாத்தியன் மொசபடோமிய என மூன்று வகையான கலைகள் கொண்டது.












பழைய ஏற்பாட்டில் எஸ்தரின் நூலில் காணப்படும் ஒர் சுவர் சித்திரக் காட்சி; காலம் கி பி 245

பார்த்தியர்கள் ஈரானிய மற்றும் கிரேக்க கட்டிடக் கலை நயத்துடன், வளைவுகளுடன் கூடிய பெரும் கட்டிடங்கள் மற்றும் சிற்பங்களை வடித்தனர்.

மொழி
பார்த்தியப் பேரர்சில் அலுவல் மொழியாக கிரேக்க மொழியும்; பேச்சு மொழியாக பழைய அரமேய மொழியும், உள்ளூர் பார்த்திய மொழி, மத்திய கால பாரசீக மொழியும் விளங்கியது.

வீழ்ச்சி
சாசானியர் வம்சத்தின் முதலாம் அர்தசிர், கி பி 224-இல் பார்த்தியப் பேரரசின் இறுதி மன்னர் நான்காம் அர்தபனாஸை வென்றதன் மூலம் பார்த்தியப் பேரரசு வீழ்ச்சி கண்டது.




The Roman Empire, in the awareness of its inhabitants, was an unquestionable power, and the only one in the world. An unending stream of victories in successive wars that kept the Roman state steadily expanding seemed to confirm such beliefs. It was not until the Roman defeat at Carrhae in 53 bce that public awareness registered the existence of another power capable of challenging the Imperium Romanum and—contrary to official propaganda—commanding respect. That power was the Parthian state ruled by the Arsacid dynasty, which, when it flourished, extended from Mesopotamia all the way to the Indian peninsula, from Central Asia to the shores of the Indian Ocean. Although the Parthians originated in Central Asia, once they had conquered Iran and Mesopotamia their rulers made a claim to the Achaemenid heritage. Somewhat grotesque to the Romans, such claims became a driving force of Arsacid policies toward all their neighbors. Claims to former Achaemenid domains were not confined only to Asia Minor and the Middle East but extended to lands in Central Asia, Iran, and India.

Sources

Our knowledge of Parthian history and of the various aspects of political, social, religious, and cultural life in the Arsacid monarchy is limited by the nature and preservation of historical sources. It is, therefore, worth mentioning at least the principal sources, with due attention to who created them and for what purposes.

The primary historical data always consist of narrative sources whose authors present either the entire history of a given state or selected periods or events, showing them in a cause-and-effect chain. Unfortunately, no such historical record is (p. 165) extant that was created in Arsacid territory, as the Parthian History by Apollodorus of Artemita, born under Arsacid rule, has not been preserved in so much as an original fragment. All known records on the history of Parthia originated outside the country and in languages of neighboring peoples with whom the Parthians communicated. Works by Greek and Roman authors, to whom we owe our basic knowledge of facts and dates in Arsacid history, are the most important of such records. While indispensable, they do not all deserve equal trust, because their authors did not always possess full and plausible information, not did they fully grasp the social and political realities of the Parthian state. Moreover, they were almost invariably hostile to the Parthians and deliberately deprecated the significance of the Arsacids, who appeared as barbarians to the Greeks, and to the Romans as a burdensome obstacle in their imperial schemes.

Among the Greek authors of the Hellenistic period writing about matters concerning Parthia, Polybius has a special place. In his comprehensive historical work, preserved in fragments, he devoted much attention to the eastern policies of the Seleucids. It is he who transmits to us a description of Antiochus III's expedition to the east late in the third century ce, which was of much consequence for the development of Seleucid relations with the newly created Parthian state.

Intense mutual contacts and numerous conflicts between the Arsacids and Rome from the first century bce to the third century ce caused the Romans to take a closer interest in the affairs of their eastern neighbor. This led to more attention being devoted to it in works on geography as well as history. The earlier category includes Geographia by Strabo and Naturalis Historia by Pliny the Elder. Both contain descriptions of the Parthian state, complete with much historical background. The two authors drew from many no longer extant older and contemporary works. Strabo used, among others, works of Poseidonius of Apamea and Apollodorus of Artemita. Standing apart in this category is the little work Stathmoi Parthikoi written by a first-century ce author, Isidore of Charax, a Parthian subject, describing the route from Mesopotamia to Hyrcania, complete with information on stations along the way and historical events involved. The list of historical works offering broad discussions on Parthian matters is much longer. Of greatest value for the study of Parthia's earlier history is the Historiae Philippicae, a general history of the antique world from Philip II and Alexander of Macedonia to Augustus, written by the late first-century ce author Pompeius Trogus. The work has been preserved to this day as a comprehensive epitome by M. Junianus Iustinus as well as the original prologues to each of its forty-two books. Despite Justin's free dealing with his original text and occasional sentences that end with a different hero and event than they began with, the fruit of the epitomizer's labors affords us an outline of Parthian history from the making of their state in the mid-third century to the close of the first century bce.

Abundant with political and armed conflict, Roman rivalry with the Arsacids for influence in Armenia and the Middle East could not help having its episodes reflected in historical literature. In their stories, Roman authors writing in Greek and Latin often reached for examples from the more distant past, which enriched (p. 166) their accounts with otherwise unknown information. Notable among such works is the Historia Romana written at the turn of the first century ce by Velleius Paterculus, which deals with developments in the East in the times of Emperor Augustus. A comprehensive account of Parthian-Roman relations we owe to Tacitus, the author of the Annales and Historiae, works devoted to the history of Rome in the period from 14 to 96 ce, which unfortunately are not preserved in their entirety. Tacitus's contemporary was Josephus Flavius. Although his focus was the history of the Jews from Biblical times to the mid-first century ce (Antiquitates Judaicae) and the Jewish revolt against Rome in 66–73 ce (Bellum Iudaicum), his works contain much information on Parthian history. Later authors include Plutarch of Chaeronea, the biographer of notable historical figures, whose lives of M. Licinius Crassus and Mark Antony supply valuable data on the Parthian state and the conflicts with Parthia caused by those leaders. Cassius Dio (fl. third century ce) devotes much space to Parthian-Roman relations in his Historia Romana, spanning Rome's history from its founding to his own time. Owing to its value, the work occupies a special place in Roman historical writing. However, like others mentioned above, it did not survive to our time as a whole, which has prevented us from filling many gaps in our knowledge of the final stage of the Arsacid state, to which Cassius Dio bore witness.

It was an expression of special interest in Parthia that some of the Roman authors wrote books entirely devoted to the history of the latter. All that we know are scanty fragments, too short to be of much use, or just titles. This category includes Parthica, written in the first half of the second century ce by Flavius Arrianus.

The second century ce, thick with conflict between Rome and Parthia, saw the appearance in Rome of a large number of eulogistic works extolling the successes of Rome's rulers and military leaders in their struggles with the eastern neighbor. The veracity and credibility of such accounts was questionable even in the eyes of their contemporaries.

Narrative texts with a bearing on Parthian history also include those composed in Oriental languages. Of these, the most important are those in Chinese, but their value in reconstructing the history of the Arsacid state is rather limited, because of their fragmentary treatment and the difficult-to-identify names of heroes and places.

Although the primary narrative sources concerning the Arsacids are of foreign origin, this does not mean that no historical records are available from within their empire. At least a few categories can be distinguished. Chief among them are numismatic sources. We have available to us coins issued by Parthian rulers beginning from Arsaces I. Within the Arsacid state, the right of coinage belonged not only to monarchs (coins were issued also by sundry usurpers) but also to some Greek cities under their rule. Coins were also issued by chieftains of the different peoples under the scepter of the Arsacids from the moment they managed to shed Parthian rule. The variety of this coinage, including representations and legends on the coins, supplies numerous hints about the internal history of the Arsacid state, although (p. 167) many objective difficulties involved in this type of source prevent their full interpretation. Numismatic sources, like the seals found during archeological excavations, are indispensable to studies on Parthian iconography.

One type of local historical source is made up of signs accompanying the rock reliefs popular in the art of the Iranian cultural circle. Some of them are easily associated with known events and figures. Others lack characteristics needed for precise dating or feature figures bearing common names that are impossible to identify; they bear mute witness to unspecified events.

It is crucial to mention another kind of source that can be classified as documentary. These are records of legal acts and documents released by state institutions in the course of operations. The former are exemplified by unique parchments discovered in Avroman that detail land sale contracts. The latter include ostraca unearthed in great numbers during excavations at New Nisa; these are documents concerning business matters and were a product of Parthian bureaucracy in operation. This category of sources is also known from other sites.

Some material is available from Parthian territory that is of great value and has long been known, but has been made fully available to scholars only due to recent publications. It consists of cuneiform texts of the astronomical diaries produced in Mesopotamian temples. Their uniqueness as a historical source results from their continuity and the exact dating of their entries. The texts recorded astronomical phenomena. Whenever weather conditions allowed it, the sky was observed every day. In addition, from time to time the scribes noted important local events and various natural phenomena, and while they were at it, they even entered food prices. The result is an extraordinary local chronicle spanning several centuries. Many fragments of those astronomical texts originated from the period of Arsacid rule in Mesopotamia. Thanks to the historical data contained in them, researchers have gained an insight into events entirely absent from other records.

A separate body of evidence comes from archeological discoveries. This evidence, though of limited value, nevertheless casts much light on various aspects of Parthian art and material culture. Excavations at Old Nisa that unearthed the remains of a Parthian palace complex have enriched us with knowledge on the material and spiritual culture of the early Arsacids. Other aspects of this culture have been studied thanks to excavations at Dura-Europos, Seleucia on the Tigris, and many other sites.

Despite the great variety and growing number of sources, our knowledge of Parthian history still contains important blanks we are not able to fill. This is partly due to the fact that until recently, many researchers neglected the importance of the Parthian period in the history of ancient Iran, treating it as a transition period between the Achaemenid and Sasanian eras, and as such undeserving of closer attention. One result of this attitude, prevalent especially in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was the belittling and even the deliberate destruction of materials and finds from the Parthian era uncovered during excavations in Mesopotamia and Iran.

(p. 168) History

Our knowledge of the making of the Parthian state and of its chronology is full of gaps. We know that it was started by the nomadic tribe of Parni (or Aparni), belonging to the Dahae group of Iranian peoples. Following migrations from Central Asia in search of, among other things, more arable land, they managed in the first half of the third century bce to occupy territories belonging to the Seleucid state on the Atrek River and along the Kopet Dagh mountain range. Their expansion was facilitated by difficulties the Seleucids were facing just then; they were absorbed in heavy fighting with the Celts, who were making inroads into Asia Minor, and in wars with Egyptian rulers over Palestine. The first leader of the Parni known by name was Arsaces, who, perhaps in the mid-third century bce, conquered Astauene, a land lying between the river Atrek and the Caspian Sea. It is recognized that this event is connected with the beginning of the so-called Arsacid era in 247 bce, the starting date of the official Parthian chronology used throughout the state's existence; it is the first certain date in its history, perhaps connected with Arsaces’ assumption of the royal title in the city of Asaak, lying in Astauene. Yet we cannot state with confidence whether he really was crowned that year or later, especially since Arsaces’ possession of this title is not confirmed by legends on coins issued by him.

By 238 bce, the invaders had managed to colonize other lands, including Parthyene, after which they acquired the name of Parthians. Their expansion was made possible by the earlier rebellions of satraps of Bactria and Parthyene. Bactria's ruler Diodotus and the Parthyene satrap Andragoras had claimed independence; the former even adopted the title of king. Such centrifugal tendencies stripped the Seleucids of control over the lands that had belonged to them from the collapse of Alexander the Great's empire.

An attempt to regain the lost territory was made about 230 bce by Seleucus II. It put Arsaces in a difficult position, as he had simultaneously to face the Bactrian ruler. A truce with the Bactrians enabled him to avoid fighting on two fronts, but even then, faced with Seleucus II's army, he was forced to withdraw from captured territories and retreat into Central Asia. Finally, however, the Syrian ruler's retreat, caused by trouble in the western regions of the Seleucid empire, enabled Arsaces not only to reclaim full control over all the lands he had seized before but probably also to increase his holdings in the south. The successes he had won, combined with an alliance with the Bactrian ruler made after Seleucus II's withdrawal, reinforced Arsaces’ leadership and permitted him to start laying the foundations for Parthian statehood, which became necessary once the Parthians, having conquered vast arable lands guaranteeing subsistence, lost their interest in migrations in favor of settled life. Consequent to this development was a need to expand local administrative centers and to safeguard their own territory from aggression by neighbors and enemies. Arsaces chose his capital probably somewhere in Parthyene. Although excavations at Old Nisa have not so far yielded any finds identifiable with his activity, the center's exceptional political role in the times of his successors suggests his special (p. 169) links with it. Arsaces’ achievements won him enormous respect among the Parthians and the status of the “father of the nation.” His name became a royal honorific used by all his successors in the Arsacid dynasty he started.

For a long time, contradictory accounts led scholars to dispute the historicity of Arsaces I and the identity of his successor, since some ancient authors relate that after the brief reign of Arsaces I, the throne was occupied by his brother, Tiridates. New interpretations of the sources and the numismatic evidence have helped to modify this picture profoundly. It is now unquestionable that the figure of Tiridates is ahistorical and Parthia's first ruler continued to reign for decades, until ca. 217 bce, when he was succeeded by his son, known as Arsaces II (ca. 217 – ca. 191 bce). At the end of the third century bce, following prolonged peace with the Seleucids, the new ruler had to face Antiochus III, who had decided to restore Seleucid control over territories lost to Parthian and Bactrian rulers. The confrontation, although a hard trial for Arsaces II, ended in his major political success. Antiochus, probably for the price of formal subordination, allowed Arsaces to exercise power, thus consenting to a Parthian state. As Seleucid influence in Iran and Central Asia dwindled and their state was weakened as a result of Antiochus III's defeat in a war with Rome, Arsaces II's acknowledgment of Syrian domination had little lasting political effect in practice.

After the death of Arsaces II, the Parthian throne fell in ca. 191 bce to the so-called younger Arsacid line. Its first representatives were Phriapatius (ca. 191–176 bce) and his son Phraates (ca. 176 – ca. 171 bce). Sources are almost silent about this period in Parthian history. The few facts we know include Phraates I's conquest of the Mardi tribe inhabiting lands south of the Caspian Sea and its resettlement in Parthian-dominated lands of Choarene and Comisene to protect the strategically vital Caspian Gates area. This may suggest that Phraates continued a policy of expansion of his state. We also have grounds to suppose that he greatly helped strengthen the ruler's political position. This was demonstrated by his decision to hand the throne not, as was customary, to his son but rather to his younger brother, Mithradates (or Mithridates), who went down in history as Mithradates I the Great (ca. 171–ca. 132 bce).

Few rulers in Arsacid history were as distinguished as Mithradates I. During his reign, the Parthian state was transformed from an insignificant political center to a vast and mighty empire. The transformation was the fruit of his large-scale policy of expansion. The detailed chronology of his conquests, given the dearth of sources, is not well known. Even accepted dates are a matter of convention. Mithradates’ first booty is believed to have been Bactria, conquered probably in the 150s bce. By 148 bce, Media and Media Atropatene had been overrun. In 141 bce, Parthian armies, having occupied much of Mesopotamia, reached Seleucia on the Tigris and Babylon. Yet a complete subjugation of Mesopotamia took much more time and effort. Mithradates exchanged blows in defense of his possessions with Demetrius II, king of Syria, who launched an attempt to regain lost land in Mesopotamia in 139/138 bce. However, his greatest distress came from Hyspaosines, king of Characene—a state whose name is derived from its capital city of Charax, (p. 170) situated on the Persian Gulf—and the kings of Elymais. The Parthians did manage to break their resistance, but only after many years of heavy fighting. Although Mithradates I and his successors did force both rulers into submission, Parthian hegemony over their lands proved rather short-lived. In addition, some sources mention Mithradates’ conquest of lands between Iran and the Indian frontier, but the truth of such claims is beyond confirmation.

The state became with each new conquest an ever more colorful cultural and ethnic mixture, requiring of its ruler greater activity in administration and social policy. It seems that Mithradates I retained in conquered territories the existing administrative structures, entrusting leadership of them not only to his own men but also to representatives of local elites who pledged loyalty to the new overlord. He attempted to win the favor of the Greek populace, which, as territories grew, became an increasingly large proportion of his subjects. An expression of this attitude is the title Philhellene (Philhellên), which he included in his royal titulature.

During the reign of Phraates II (ca. 132–126 bce), another attempt was made by the Seleucids to recapture the lands of Media and Mesopotamia lost to the Parthians. In 131–129 bce, the king of Syria, Antiochus VII Sidetes, scored important successes, but his mistakes led to his death and decisively buried Seleucid hopes of recovering territorial losses. Almost immediately after that, Phraates had to make his way east to defend his frontiers from the nomadic Scythians, and his last years on the throne were marked by large-scale migrations of peoples inhabiting the vast territories of Central Asia and Afghanistan. Their arrival caused considerable political changes. Even though the Sakas were not an immediate threat to the Parthian state, their presence forced the ruler to take vigorous action to ensure the security of his eastern and northern borders. It was during struggles with them that Phraates lost his life. From then on, defense from invaders became a major challenge facing the Arsacids. The extent of the problem is proved by the fact that in the decades that followed, at least several Parthian kings, including Phraates II's successor, Artabanus I (ca. 126–123/122 bce), were killed in conflicts with those peoples.

Another period of rising Parthian imperial power came during the reign of Mithradates II (122–91 bce). Upon ascending to the throne, he first had to deal with king Hyspaosines of Characene, who had taken advantage of Artabanus I's engagement with the nomads not only to release himself from dependence on Parthia but also to overrun all of southern Mesopotamia, probably complete with Seleucia on the Tigris and Babylon. In ca. 122/121 bce, Mithradates forced him to submit to Parthian domination once again.

Soon after these events Mithradates took an interest in northern Mesopotamia and Armenia, thus far lying outside the sphere of Parthian politics. As a result of his political and military actions, more lands accrued and new rulers were subordinated: those of Adiabene, Gordyene, and Osrhoene, with additional influence won in Armenia. Additionally, Parthian interests were furthered in Asia Minor and the Middle East. The political program drawn by Mithradates II assumed Arsacid recapture of lands once belonging to the Achaemenid Persian Empire. His adoption in 109 bce of the title of “King of Kings” must have been a propaganda ploy designed (p. 171) as part of that program. Together with involvement in the west, Mithradates successfully pursued a policy of recovering lost terrain in Central Asia and eastern Iran. This accomplishment made it possible to open land routes between China and the Mediterranean world. Since they all crossed Arsacid imperial territories, revenues from duties and taxes on luxury goods being transported became an important source of wealth for Parthian rulers.

It is indicative of Mithradates II's determination in seeking to strengthen Parthian influences in eastern Anatolia and in Armenia that he sent in 96 bce a legation to Sulla, governor of the Roman province of Cilicia, proposing a treaty of friendship and cooperation, conditional on Rome's acceptance of the Euphrates as a line between their respective spheres of influence. As Parthia was still a completely unknown factor to the Romans, the Parthian king's initiative was ignored by Sulla; nevertheless, from then on relations between the two states became increasingly frequent and more formal. Toward the end of his reign, Mithradates actively joined in the struggles between Demetrius III and Philip, pretenders to the Seleucid throne, in hopes that his support of one of the rivals would help him gain powerful influence in Syria, which would enable him to have an active say in Mediterranean politics. Although Demetrius was taken prisoner, the plan never saw fruition. Its fulfillment was blocked by internal problems in the monarchy, as ca. 92 bce Mithradates was challenged by the usurper Gotarzes, who had probably gained control over the empire's eastern satrapies, supported by local rich and influential aristocratic families, and over a large part of Mesopotamia. However, civil war was prevented by the king's natural death.

After Mithradates II's death, the Parthian state found itself faced with a political crisis that lasted for more than ten years. It resulted in a weakening of central authority, territorial losses to the neighbors, and a decline in Parthia's international significance. Such domestic troubles in the Arsacid domain were grist for the mill of King Tigranes of Armenia, who quickly amassed vast lands under his scepter. His major successes included capture from Parthia of a strategic region in Armenia occupied years before by Mithradates II, subjugation of some Parthian-held areas in northern Mesopotamia, and ascent to the Seleucid throne. The last success came his way without much effort through support from local elites, tired from the decades-long struggle for the crown between members of Syria's ruling family. The crisis situation was only overcome by Sinatruces (or Sanatruces), who ascended to the Arsacid throne ca. 88/87 bce.

Soon after the passing of Mithradates II, the Parthian state found itself bordering a vast theater of war begun in 74 bce and, at its height, spreading into parts of Asia Minor, the Caucasus, Armenia, and Syria. The hostilities were triggered by a conflict between Mithradates VI Eupator, king of Pontus, and Rome. Although Mithradates VI attempted to draw the Parthians into the war, Sinatruces insisted on maintaining neutrality. His son and successor Phraates III (ca. 71/70–58/57 bce) acted likewise, first in response to an invitation to join an anti-Roman coalition envisaged by Mithradates VI and Tigranes, and again in 69 bce to demands from the Roman commander Lucullus to lend him support in his campaign against both (p. 172) rulers. It seems that Phraates III's consistent policies brought the Parthians some gains as Lucullus agreed to recognize the Euphrates as a line of division of the respective states’ spheres of influence. The same was confirmed by Cn. Pompeius (Pompey), from 66 bce Lucullus's successor, in the hope that it would help him secure the support of Phraates or at least prevent his joining the anti-Roman alliance, whose conclusion was again suggested to Phraates by Mithradates VI. Pompey's efforts failed to produce the desired result as the Parthian king kept aloof from the war being fought, concentrating on the conflict in Armenia between Tigranes and his son Tigranes the Younger. Although the younger challenger whom he supported lost his struggle for the throne, Phraates succeeded in recovering some Parthian lands captured years before by the king of Armenia. Interference in Armenian affairs led to tensions in Phraates III's relations with Pompey, but an all-out conflict with Rome was prevented. As an unexpected outcome of Pompey's policies toward the kings of Armenia and Parthia, the latter two made peace in 64 bce.

Phraates III's reign was terminated by a coup staged in 58/57 bce by his sons, Orodes II and Mithradates III. Conflicts between the two continued until ca. 54/53 bce. The final victor was Orodes, who immediately found himself having to defend his state from an unexpected assault by the Roman governor of Syria, M. Licinius Crassus. The attack was caused purely by the Roman's personal ambitions and hopes of an easy victory with abundant spoils. Encouraged by his good fortune in 54 bce, in the following year Crassus launched a massive campaign that ended at Carrhae in a rout of his army and his own death. Given the grave internal problems caused by struggles with aristocratic opposition, Orodes II could not immediately enjoy all the fruits of his victory. He succeeded only in subordinating king Artavasdes II of Armenia, earlier an ally of Crassus, and thus strengthening Parthian influence in that country. Only in 51 bce did his armies enter Syria. Still, with the opposition leaders scheming with the Romans, Orodes was forced to withdraw from there in 50 bce. Although the domestic situation prevented the king for many years from pursuing an active external policy, he would not let pass an opportunity to interfere in Roman affairs once that country found itself facing civil war. He decided to lend an armed hand to the killers of the Roman dictator Julius Caesar, who had gained control over Asia Minor and Syria. The political chaos that followed their defeat led Orodes again to attack Roman possessions in the East. In 40 bce, a Parthian corps under Q. Aetius Labienus, a Roman republican who had defected to Orodes, entered Anatolia; another, led by Pacorus, son of Orodes, invaded Syria. A Roman counteroffensive was launched soon afterwards by Mark Antony, obliterating Parthian successes. In 39 bce, pressure from Roman troops forced Labienus out of Asia Minor. Finally, defeat at Gindaros in 38 bce, in which Pacorus was killed, made the Parthians evacuate all their forces from Syria. On the death of his beloved son, Orodes II gave himself to mourning, relinquishing power to another son, Phraates IV.

Phraates IV (38–3/2 bce), probably fearing for the security of his position, upon ascending to the throne performed an unprecedented crackdown on actual and potential opponents. The measure had the opposite of the desired effect. Many aristocrats hostile to Phraates fled to Roman territory, from where, with Roman support, (p. 173) they began a successful struggle with the king. This situation, posing a danger to Phraates as it was combined with an expedition against Parthia being prepared by Mark Antony, made the king enter into negotiations with opposition leaders. These were successful, and the dangerous émigrés returned home. Despite losing such allies, Mark Antony persisted in his plan and in 36 bce struck at Media Atropatene, the geographical position of which facilitated attack on Parthian territory. However, cooperation between king Artavasdes of Media and Phraates IV led to a Roman defeat. A contributing factor was the neutrality in the conflict of king Artavasdes II of Armenia. In retribution, Mark Antony overran Armenia in 34 bce, taking captive the whole royal family except Artavasdes II's son Artaxes, who found refuge at the Parthian court. Mark Antony's preparations for war with Octavian left Phraates more freedom of action. In 33 bce he attacked Media Atropatene, whose ruler, after a short friendship with the king of Parthia, had made an alliance with Mark Antony, and conquered it in 32 bce. As his next goal, Phraates set his sights on Armenia, where he put on the throne the son of Artavasdes II, Artaxes II.

Such successes helped to strengthen Parthian influence in areas of great strategic significance for Parthian security, but they did little to pacify internal strife. In 31 bce, Phraates IV was challenged by Tiridates I, a usurper backed by some of the aristocracy, who took years of fighting to defeat and drive off. Tiridates took one of the king's sons with him, which made it easier for him to find refuge on Roman territory. Phraates demanded that the Romans release the son and extradite Tiridates, but years of diplomatic efforts only resulted in the return of the son. Octavian, having just defeated Mark Antony at Actium in 31 bce, started systematic action to restore Roman control over Armenia and neighboring lands. Yet it did not significantly affect the relations between Rome and the Parthian state. Change only occurred in 20 bce, when, faced with serious trouble at home and military pressure from Rome, Phraates decided to make some concessions: he returned some Roman legionary standards that the Parthians had captured in battle at Carrhae and released all Roman prisoners of war. This decision by the Parthian king was seen by some among the Armenian aristocracy as a sign of his weakness and led them to murder Artaxes II and turn to Rome for help in the enthronement of another monarch. These events opened a long period of fighting between Rome and the Arsacids for influence in Armenia, to be concluded in 1 ce, during the reign of Phraataces (Phraates V) (3/2 bce–2 ce), the son of Phraates IV. In the same year, a meeting was held between Gaius Caesar, the adoptive son of the Roman emperor, and the king of Parthia. In its aftermath, Rome recognized the Parthian state as an equal partner and, more importantly, stopped questioning Phraataces’ right to the crown in return for his giving up his claims to Armenia as well as his demands that the Romans return his brothers who had been living from 10/9 bce with their families in Rome, where they had been sent by Phraates IV to prevent a dynastic conflict in the Arsacid family.

Consent to Roman hegemony in Armenia resulted from Phraataces’ precarious position in the country. The Roman recognition of his right to the crown, much needed to confront his domestic opposition, did not protect him from loss of power. (p. 174) In 4 ce, a group of aristocrats put on the throne Orodes III, who, however, was murdered in 6 ce. On his death, some Parthian aristocrats requested the Roman emperor Augustus (27 bce–14 ce) to consent to hand the crown to the son of Phraates IV, Vonones, who was living in Rome. The new ruler quickly alienated his subjects, one important reason being his having become Romanized. This presented an opportunity to Artabanus II, a member of a side line of the Arsacids, who, after years of fighting Vonones and his supporters, succeeded in ca. 11/12 in achieving victory. The defeated rival took shelter in Armenia and soon became its king. An attempt by Artabanus II to replace him with his own son caused immediate reaction from Rome, which could tolerate Vonones but not the rise to power in Armenia of an Arsacid it considered a serious threat to its interests. To safeguard those, Emperor Tiberius (14–37 ce) sent to the east his stepson Germanicus in 18. His mission met with no opposition from the Parthians and concluded in the enthronement in Armenia of Rome's protégé, Artaxias III. Since Rome had desisted in supporting Vonones, Artabanus accepted the emergent situation in Armenia. To confirm the friendly relations between the two states, Germanicus and Artabanus met on an island in the Euphrates in 18 ce. Once the Parthian king had accepted the situation in Armenia, he was free to concentrate on his monarchy's internal affairs. He took steps to reinforce Arsacid positions in vassal lands, subordinate some lands in eastern Iran, and strengthen the king's authority. The success of this policy helped define his political program, which not only guided his own actions but later became a road sign for his successors. Called the neo-Iranian program, it had as its guiding idea a claim of the Arsacids on the legal heritage of the Achaemenids and their consequent right to lands once belonging to the Persian Empire.

In 35, more than ten years of peace between Parthia and Rome came to an end when after the heirless death of Artaxias III, Artabanus II made an attempt to put his own son on the Armenian throne. The rationale behind the move was to implement the program of Achaemenid imperial restoration. To stop the king, Tiberius decided to lend his ear to the requests of aristocrats opposed to Artabanus and sent on his way to Parthia another of Phraates IV's sons, also named Phraates. After his unexpected death in Syria, the emperor dispatched Tiridates, a grandson of Phraates IV, who succeeded in conquering a large part of the country and the capital at Ctesiphon. The situation in Armenia, already difficult for Artabanus, was further complicated as king Mithradates of Caucasian Iberia joined in the struggle for its throne. Despite that, in 36, with ample help from a group of loyal aristocrats, Artabanus forced Tiridates to withdraw. In the spring of 37, the Parthian king met with the then governor of Syria, L. Vitellius, and the two men made some important agreements whereby Artabanus resigned from further struggle for Armenia, Rome recognized the Euphrates as the border between the two empires, and the Parthian monarch's rule was vindicated as legal. While relations with Rome improved dramatically, Artabanus still faced serious domestic problems. One of them was the rebellion of Seleucia on the Tigris which broke out in 36 (his power over the city was not reasserted until 42); another was unrest in Parthian-controlled Adiabene. Although the time of Artabanus II was not peaceful, his reign helped strengthen the state.

(p. 175) With the death of Artabanus II, disturbances ensued and continued for over ten years, involving pretenders to the throne supported by various aristocratic groups. His son and successor, Vardanes I (ca. 39–45 ce) was not able to settle them. One of those involved pretenders was Rome-based Meherdates, the son of Vonones, who arrived in Parthia in 48. This stage of political strife was only concluded when Vologases I ascended to the throne (ca. 51–78/79 ce). It seems that from the start of his reign Vologases tried with consistency to implement the political program defined by Artabanus II. This is best exemplified by his attempts to strengthen the Arsacid position in lands within the Parthian sphere of influence by placing his own brothers on the respective thrones. The first such decision was to put Pacorus in power in Media Atropatene; the second, much more significant politically, was the enthronement of Tiridates in Armenia in 53. Vologases must have anticipated possible confrontation arising from this step, and he was determined to risk it. A Roman response came with Nero (54–68 ce) on the throne. Such as the conflict was, it favored the Parthian king until unexpected difficulties arose: the usurpation in 54/55 of his own son Vardanes and—a little later—disturbances in Hyrcania. These emergencies forced Vologases to recall his troops from Armenia, allowing the Romans to occupy it and install their own favorite on its throne. Once he settled the domestic disruption, Vologases rejoined the war for Armenia. Its turning point proved to be the Parthian victory over the Romans at Rhandeia in 62. The event brought the warring sides to the negotiating table, where they concluded in the following year a mutually satisfactory agreement on Armenia: the Parthian king obtained the right to appoint a candidate for the Armenian crown, while the Roman emperor enjoyed the privilege of crowning him. While this meant that formally Rome decided the holder of the Armenian crown, in reality it amounted to Rome surrendering Armenia to Arsacid political influence.

Once he put his Armenian affairs in order, Vologases could concentrate on internal problems. His attention was focused on reestablishing a real authority in southern Mesopotamia and neighboring Susiana and Elymais. While these lands were formally subordinated to the Parthian king, their leaders wasted no opportunity to loosen the ties that constricted them and even attempted to shake their dependence altogether. We may surmise that in ca. 73 Vologases regained seniority over Characene, as is suggested by an interruption, beginning that year and lasting decades, in its coinage. Soon afterward he restored his influence in Susiana and Elymais as well as in Persis. Under the reign of Vologases and that of his successor, Pacorus II, Parthian interest grew in the lands of Choresmia, Bactria, and the Hindu Kush. The presence of Parthian elements in the coinage of various political centers in those lands attests to the influences both rulers had in the area. Nor was Vologases I's activity restricted to political action. He put much effort into the building of strategically located fortresses and the founding of new cities. This proved beneficial to the whole state, as Parthian control over all of Mesopotamia afforded favorable conditions for trade and communication between the Mediterranean and the Orient, broadly understood. Such control over the Persian Gulf area helped navigation and exchange reaching as far as the Indian Peninsula. Guarantees of security on (p. 176) land routes across Iran and Central Asia intensified relations with China and assured Parthia a monopoly on trade with that country. Such contacts also concerned an alliance against the ever more powerful ruler of the Kushan kingdom. Involvement in the north and east notwithstanding, Parthian-Roman relations continued undiminished later in Vologases’ reign. The anti-Roman insurrection in Judea (66–70 ce) and later struggles between pretenders to the Roman throne in 68–69 were situations that the Parthian ruler tried, without much success, to use to his own advantage. Attempted interference in Rome's internal affairs caused tensions in mutual relations. These intensified when Vespasian (69–79 ce) became emperor. Rome's distrust for its eastern neighbor was demonstrated as he began a military buildup along the joint border on the Euphrates, continued by his sons Titus (79–81) and Domitian (81–96).

Vologases I's policies were continued by his son, Pacorus II (ca. 78–ca. 110), who probably had gained experience as a coruler at his father's side. He, too, late in his reign, shared his power with his son, Vologases III (ca. 110–147). Late in Pacorus II's and early in Vologases III's reigns, the usurper Osroes I made his presence felt. Most probably a native of Elymais, he succeeded in taking over a significant portion of the Parthian state, including a large chunk of Mesopotamia. His decisions regarding the holder of the Armenian throne violated the Rhandeia treaty and presented a pretext to Trajan (98–117) to launch an expedition against the Arsacid state in 113. Although the Romans scored some military successes (they captured Ctesiphon and reached the Persian Gulf), these lacked permanence. Having briefly taken the initiative in Armenian affairs and having installed on the Arsacid throne a candidate after their own hearts, they lost some of their gains even before Trajan's death and the remnant soon afterward, as his successor Hadrian (117–134) gave them up. Yet Osroes I's challenge to Parthia's legal authority did not disappear without trace. In unknown circumstances, Vologases III recognized his authority over the territories under his control, probably for the price of Osroes I's allegiance to the Parthian king. This solution would assure the Parthian state decades of relative domestic peace and later bring Osroes’ descendants the Arsacid crown. The peace greatly helped further development of trade links between the Mediterranean and the East (confirmed by numerous testimonies), with a particular role played in this by Palmyra in the second century ce. During the reign of Vologases III, Parthian-Roman relations were mostly satisfactory, though not without some tensions. Two meetings of Vologases and Hadrian in 123 and 129 did not bring about major changes. For Parthia, much more important at the time were events in other areas of its empire. In the Caucasus, tensions mounted, caused by the activities of Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, who was instrumental in an invasion of the nomadic Alans into Parthian lands in ca. 135. The growth and expansion of the Kushan kingdom forced the Parthians to pursue more vigorous political and military policies in the east to strengthen their position there.

A landmark in the reign of Vologases IV (147–191/192) was a restoration, one more time, about 150/151, of Parthian supremacy over Characene, which had been outside the Arsacid orbit of influence since Trajan's expedition. With the amount of (p. 177) trade going though that land, its independence was a loss of much revenue to the Parthians. In 161, Vologases unexpectedly launched a war on Rome. It was the first conflict between the two states in which the attackers were the Parthians. Its beginning coincided with the ascent to the Roman throne of Marcus Aurelius (161–179). The scenario of events suggests that Vologases meant to capture Armenia and Syria simultaneously. On the Armenian throne he put his own appointee, Pacorus, while an unexpected assault on Syria enabled him to defeat the Roman troops stationed there. Confidence in his own superiority prompted Vologases to reject a Roman peace proposal in 162. Despite their dire position early in 163, the Romans under Lucius Verus launched a counteroffensive and regained control over Armenia later in the same year. In 164, the Parthians lost Syria for good. Roman troops commanded by Avidius Cassius moved along the Euphrates to capture Dura-Europos. The success was of great significance to the Romans, as it caused many vassal rulers to leave the side of Vologases and put the initiative in Roman hands. In late 165 or early 166, Avidius Cassius subjugated Seleucia on the Tigris, and soon afterward Ctesiphon. Probably at more or less the same time, other Roman troops entered Adiabene and Media. The Romans’ Mesopotamian campaign concluded unexpectedly, for they were forced to withdraw in spring 166 because of heavy casualties inflicted on them by a plague that had broken out in Seleucia. Soon afterwards, the war terminated completely. As its result, Vologases IV lost to Rome a vast portion of his lands in northern Mesopotamia. Despite this setback, he would not stop struggling for influence in Armenia, yet with no lasting success. A lost war with Rome helped pacify relations between the two states, but a formal settlement of disputes did not come about until probably 176.

Renewed tensions between the two empires occurred under Vologases V (191/192–ca. 208). They were sparked off by the Parthian ruler taking the side of Pescennius Niger against Septimius Severus during a civil war in Rome (192–193) and interference in the internal affairs of Rome's vassal states in northern Mesopotamia (Adiabene, Osroene). In revenge, Septimius Severus (193–211), who had defeated other pretenders to the imperial purple, invaded northern Mesopotamia in 195 and transformed Osroene into a Roman province, thus putting an end to Parthian attempts to uphold their influence in the area. Actual combat with the Parthians took placed during a second expedition that Septimius Severus conducted in 198. He succeeded in reaching as far as Ctesiphon, but, as in the first expedition, his attempt to capture Hatra failed despite a long siege. The peace that concluded the hostilities reasserted Roman dominance in northern Mesopotamia and Armenia.

The mutual peace between Parthia and Rome was breached by the son and successor of Septimius Severus, Caracalla (211–217). He took advantage of internal conflicts in the Arsacid empire in the first years of Vologases VI's rule (ca. 208–221/22), caused by claims to the throne by the latter's younger brother, Artabanus IV, who had gained control over much of the country, including Media and Susiana. Confusion in the Parthian empire caused by its virtual split between two brothers led Caracalla to try to subjugate Armenia, an attempt that failed because of an anti-Roman insurrection. Nor did a simple continuation of his father's policy, in hopes (p. 178) of further successes, bring desired results. The excuse for the attack was claimed to be an escape to Parthia of two Roman subjects, but their handing over by Vologases VI left Caracalla without a pretext to declare war. An open conflict only came about following the Roman emperor's futile wooing of Artabanus IV's daughter. Whatever armed inroads the Romans made into Parthia did not bring Caracalla meaningful victories, as the Parthians avoided serious engagement. The expedition was terminated by the emperor's unexpected death in April 217, which came at a highly unfavorable moment for the Romans. A Parthian counteroffensive defeated them in the battle of Nisibis. In this situation, Macrinus, the emperor's successor, who had been instrumental in his death, sought immediate peace talks. In a treaty signed in 218, Macrinus pledged to pay the Parthians liberal compensation for the damage done by the Roman incursion and not to interfere in Armenian affairs. The accord also confirmed the existing border between the two states. The peace of 218 is the last known event in the history of Parthian-Roman relations.

Successful though the war with Rome was, it did not prevent Parthia's internal crisis, which soon led to its downfall. The crisis started in vassal rebellions that the Parthian monarchs were not able to deal with. Especially dangerous was the revolt of Ardashir, the ruler of Persis. No sooner had he risen to power in ca. 220 than he began vigorously to spread his influence into neighboring areas. He also secured the support of the Parthian vassal rulers of Media and Adiabene, as well as tribal chieftains, which enabled the coalition to overrun all of Mesopotamia except Hatra. At first, Artabanus IV thought little of the adversary and bided his time before he took steps against him. These were concluded by the king's death and Parthian defeat in a battle fought in September 224. By 226, Ardashir held control over Ctesiphon, previously belonging to Vologases VI. It was probably the capture of the Parthian capital that allowed him to take the title of “King of Kings.” It seems that Vologases VI stayed in power for a short period after that, since we know of coins with his name dating from 228. However, they are the last piece of evidence for the existence of the Arsacid state. In ca. 230, power over the lands that had made up the Parthian Empire was in Ardashir's hands. His rule opened a new, four-hundred-year-long chapter in the history of ancient Iran under the Sasanian dynasty.

The Parthian monarchy

From the time of Arsaces I, the Parthian state was an absolute inherited monarchy with a traditional principle of passing down the rule to the eldest son of the ruling monarch; there was also a tradition of the Parthian king appointing his sons as corulers. This principle of succession was not, however, always strictly adhered to, as a ruler could name as his successor his brother, bypassing his own offspring. One reason for the numerous dynastic conflicts and usurpations was certainly the Arsacid practice of polygamy. By practicing dynastic unions and placing members (p. 179) of their family on the thrones of dependent states, the Arsacids greatly broadened and strengthened their influence. Despite Roman countermeasures, supported by groups of native aristocrats, they proved especially well established in Armenia, where descendants of the Arsacids ruled as late as the fourth century ce.

At least as early as the second century bce, the Arsacids began to include in their dynastic ideology clear signs stressing their links with the tradition of the Achaemenids. These included a fictitious genealogical claim showing Arsaces I and his brother as descendants of the Persian king Artaxerxes, a legendary account of how Arsaces I and his brother rose to power (through a conspiracy made up of them and five other members, which, in replicating the circumstances and the number of participants, echoed the Persian king Darius's ascent to power), a comparison of Arsaces to Cyrus, and the use of Achaemenid titulature—starting from Mithradates I, Parthian kings sporadically, and from Mithradates II regularly, used the title “King of Kings.” Intimately connected with this tradition is the distinct political program defined under Artabanus II (although some of its tenets appeared in Arsacid propaganda much earlier) in which that ruler made claims to territories once part of the Achaemenid Empire. Such claims probably applied not only to their possessions in Asia Minor and the Middle East but to all that at one time or another had found themselves under the scepter of the kings of Persia, including those in Central Asia and on the Indian frontier. The significance of the program is not to be underestimated, for it certainly determined Parthian policies toward its neighbors for a considerable period of time. References to Iranian tradition could be seen also in other spheres of life, one example being attempts to accentuate the role of Iranian-originated Zoroastrianism in the state's religious life. The same purpose was probably served by introduction of Parthian inscriptions next to Greek on coins in the time of Vologases I. Unquestionably, the Iranism propagated by the Arsacids stemmed from a need to legitimize their rule and was an important tool in the ideological integration of the empire they built.

An important attribute of the power of the Parthian monarchs was their royal headgear. Early Parthian rulers wore a cap called a bashlyk tied with a diadem, fashioned after the headgear proper for Achaemenid-period satraps. From Mithradates I to the early years of Mithradates II's reign, the symbol of royal authority was a diadem. Later, Mithradates II began using a tiara derived from the Median tradition. It was also worn by his successors, and at a later time, as vassal thrones were occupied by members of the Arsacid dynasty, the privilege was extended to dependent rulers. An important political symbol of Parthian kingship was the golden throne of the Arsacids. Looted by the Romans from Ctesiphon during Trajan's expedition, it was never returned, despite Vologases III's appeals to Hadrian.

Institutions of the Arsacid monarchy exhibit many Greek traits borrowed from the Hellenistic tradition, which, however, left only a limited stamp on it. Therefore, despite occasionally voiced opinions that it was a barbarized form of a Hellenistic monarchy, it should be seen primarily as a typical Oriental monarchy.

An important role in shaping Arsacid royal tradition and ideology was played by several cities with which they were associated throughout their history. The first such (p. 180) center was Asaak (Astauene), established by Arsaces I, which served as the Arsacid royal necropolis. The same ruler was connected with the origins of New Nisa, a royal residence that enjoyed the special protection of successive rulers as the Arsacid birthplace up to the first century bce. At later stages, the functions of a capital city were also served by Hecatompylos, Ecbatana, Rhagae, Babylon, and Ctesiphon.

Institutions and Organization of the Arsacid Empire

A detailed scrutiny of the internal structure of the Parthian state is not possible. The reason is the limited number of historical sources and the fact that not all periods in Parthia's centuries-long history are covered in the sources that are available. As a further hindrance, those structures varied in time as the Arsacid state kept expanding. A vast empire necessitated an extended territorial administration. Its largest unit was the satrapy, which Roman authors called regnum. In the first century ce, Parthia was divided into eighteen satrapies, of which eleven, lying to the east of Armenia and the Caspian Sea, were called “upper” and the remaining seven “lower.” Their shape and extent principally reflected that of each new land conquered by the Arsacids in the course of their history. Source information suggests that typically they used for their own administrative purposes any organizational structures already existing in captured territories. In this respect, the Arsacids pursued a policy resembling that of the Seleucids, who built their administration on Achaemenid structures. Maintaining a continuity of administrative tradition and practice as preexisting in a given area and avoiding rapid changes facilitated its integration with the empire. For the same reason, Parthian rulers sometimes appointed members of local elites as officials in newly conquered lands. Rather than suggest their weak grasp of local affairs, such a policy was a deliberate and efficient method of winning the loyalties of new subjects, especially in lands where ancient traditions needed to be respected and upheld. An important element of this policy was respecting the privileges of particular social groups, especially those that helped shape the opinions and attitudes of others. This approach is exemplified by Parthian respect for the rights of priests and the autonomy of temples in Babylonia.

A somewhat different policy was pursued by Parthian rulers toward Greek cities founded by the Seleucids, under whom such settlements enjoyed considerable autonomy. This did not radically change under the Arsacids, although the history of Seleucia on the Tigris suggests that such autonomy was often the source of tensions and serious conflicts with Parthian rulers trying to restrain it. Their purpose was easier to achieve in smaller cities. As a result, they were made increasingly dependent on the king's local officials, whose authority enabled them to interfere in cities’ internal affairs, even down to elections of city administrators. As for the status of cities established by the Arsacids themselves, no evidence is available.

(p. 181) Parthian kings presided over a considerable body of specialized officials and functionaries of various levels dealing with the collection of duties and taxes and supervising local communities and administrative units. It should be noted that while provincial administration was extensive, central government was scant.

Parthian kings also had a say in the course of affairs in vassal states. Some dependent rulers voluntarily recognized Arsacid supremacy, possible reasons being dynastic, cultural, and religious links. Such lesser kings, often from local families, possessed a relatively large freedom of movement and autonomy, including the right to mint their own coin (Adiabene, Osroene). Not infrequently, however, some rulers of lands in the Parthian sphere of influence (Elymais, Characene) were made to recognize Arsacid domination by force. This method did not always bring lasting political effects. Weakness exhibited by some Parthian kings and internal crises that rocked the Arsacid empire provided encouragement to local leaders to seek political independence time and time again. Some of these attempts led to more or less long-lived success. Yet despite strong centrifugal tendencies, the Parthian state ultimately succeeded in maintaining unity even at the most precarious junctures of its history.

Our knowledge of the Parthian army is still highly limited, as we have no detailed records of its numbers and organization. We may only suppose that at least in some satrapies—those most vulnerable to unrest or aggression by a neighbor, or of vital importance for other reasons—it employed a military administration fashioned after Seleucid solutions, headed by a high-ranking officer commanding a number of troops and resorting to local draft whenever need arose.

When the Arsacids took to arms in offensive or defensive action, they mobilized an army centered on units supplied by grand aristocratic families. Its thrusting force depended mainly on cavalry composed of two historically well-documented formations, the cataphractari, or heavily armored cavalry, and mounted archers whose mobility and long-range combat capability made them formidable opponents, as the Romans found out to their chagrin in the battle of Carrhae. Infantry was of much lesser use on the vast plains of Mesopotamia, Iran, and Central Asia, and accordingly it played a secondary role in the Parthian military, probably mostly confined to defense of fortresses.

Mercenary forces served a marginal function in the Parthian army. While the Arsacids often resorted to the deployment of such troops, they did so only in particularly dire circumstances when their own forces proved insufficient to defend themselves, or if they met with a refusal from a vassal. In offensive operations, however, mercenaries played no part. On occasion, mutinies erupting in mercenary ranks occasioned serious difficulties.

Society

A picture of the complex social relations in the multicultural and multiethnic society of the Arsacid Empire is difficult to reconstruct for want of a sufficient number of sources covering this subject. Another serious obstacle is the ambiguity, even (p. 182) contradiction, of notions applied by antique authors with reference to the Parthian society. The terms they use are more fitting for the type of relations familiar to them from Rome than descriptive of Parthian society, which was different in many respects.

As the period of great expansion had reached its end, the Arsacid Empire probably developed a model of social relations that was to some extent common to all its lands as it reflected the outcome of all the Parthian conquests, because the kings, at the expense of the vanquished, generously rewarded all those that had contributed to their successes. This policy helped not only to reinforce Parthian rule but to raise the prestige of Parthian higher social orders. Their privileged status led to the growth of several powerful and extremely rich aristocratic clans who held sway in their respective lands and exerted potent influence on the life of the country and its monarchs. The best known families include Suren, connected with Sistan; Karin, based in Media; and Gev, dominating in Hyrcania. Members of these families enjoyed a guaranteed inherited place of significance at the king's side. As an exceptional honor this might include, for example, the privilege of placing the tiara on a newly crowned monarch's head. With the passage of time, representatives of grand families began to play a decisive role in feuds and struggles between pretenders to the Arsacid crown and in conflicts between the rulers and aristocracy. Out of their number came advisors, military commanders, and the highest officers of state. Upon being commissioned as a commander, an aristocrat thus honored was obliged to supply and organize an army whose core were usually soldiers recruited from his vassals and subjects.

The close ties between individual grand families and the lands in which their domains lay largely affected their political choices. This phenomenon became manifest from the first century bce, for then the first open conflicts occurred between Parthian rulers and aristocrats. They were born out of the ambitions of some aristocrats to usurp power, out of attempts by Orodes II, Phraates IV, and others to suppress political opposition and to limit the vast privileges the aristocracy enjoyed. In such confrontations, some groups among the aristocracy, those associated with western, Hellenized lands in the Parthian Empire, sought to obtain the support of Rome. Another example of political strife is visible in uprisings by clans linked with Iran and eastern satrapies motivated by an anxiety to maintain the national character of the monarchy against the successive sons of Phraates IV on the Arsacid throne who had returned to the fatherland after a prolonged stay in Rome, where they had become so enamored of the charms of Roman culture as to abandon completely the ways of their predecessors. It was no accident that the Iranism of the Arsacids found the greatest resonance and support among the aristocracies of the eastern, or “upper,” satrapies. Their cultivation of Iranian customs was an important element in their aristocratic ethos.

Of other groups in the Parthian society, their composition, rights, and obligations, we know very little. It is assumed that native inhabitants of Parthia, who made up the lower social orders, still stood higher in the social hierarchy than their equivalents (p. 183) in Parthian-conquered lands. The subjects’ legal status defined the type of military formation in which they served. Members of the higher orders joined the cataphractari, the heavy cavalry. Their vassals fought as mounted archers, a formation highly effective on the battlefield. Although slaves must have constituted a large social group, little can be discerned about their place and role in the Parthian society.

Apart from information concerning the social organization of the Parthians themselves, sources supply considerable data on two ethnic groups that played a prominent part in the empire's life. One was the Greek population that found itself under the scepter of the Arsacids as they conquered territories previously included in the Seleucid state; the other was Jews. Among the Parthian Greeks, the largest group consisted of the descendants of Greeks and Macedonians settled in the east from the time of Alexander the Great's expedition. Other than these, there were also all those who had become Hellenized and identified with Greek culture and tradition. In the Parthian empire, the Greek population numbered at least several hundred thousand. Owing to its size and sense of cultural identity, it was an especially significant minority. Its geographical spread across the empire's territory was uneven. Its largest centers were located in lands in which settlement under the Seleucids had been the strongest and in highly urbanized areas. Such regions especially included Media, Mesopotamia, and Susiana.

The largest population center and the greatest Greek city was Seleucia on the Tigris, the third largest city of the ancient world, numbering 600,000 inhabitants at its peak. Although not all inhabitants were of that nationality, a concentration of power in the city made the Greeks the dominant force culturally and politically. Thanks to this, Seleucia retained its Greek character until the collapse of the Parthian state. Their monopoly of power the Greeks owed to the autonomy that the city obtained from the Seleucids and preserved under the Arsacids. Mithradates I, shortly after capturing the city in 141 bce, not only confirmed earlier charters but granted the city new ones. Yet despite that, a number of times in the following century Seleucia manifested its independence by taking the side of various pretenders to the throne, and Vardanes I (ca. 39–45 ce) subdued it in 42 only after more than six years of siege. A sign of the city's exceptional legal status was its right to issue its own coinage.

In smaller centers, the situation of the Greek populace was also advantageous, since in rivalries between various groups it could effectively defend its privileged position. That the Arsacids fully recognized its importance and sought to curry its favor is best exemplified by Mithradates I's inclusion in his official royal titulature of the honorific title Philhellên; in his wake, many of his successors did the same. Although the real function of this title is still debated by researchers, it is difficult to accept the view that its adoption by Parthian kings was purely a propaganda stunt; some Arsacids did not use it at all, while others included it in their titulature years after ascending to the throne. Another sign of Greek importance is seen on Parthian coins bearing legends in their language. Yet despite such favorable Arsacid attitudes and cooperative spirit, Greeks were slow to discard their bias against a nation they regarded as full of barbarians. Such attitudes caused tensions that sometimes culminated in bloody conflicts.

(p. 184) One reason Parthian kings were forced to humor Greeks was their vital role in the empire's economy. At the same time, realizing the excessive preponderance of large Greek cities in their state, the Arsacids made renewed attempts to curb their autonomy. Their interference in the municipal autonomy of Seleucia brought limited results, which made them seek other courses of action. When attempts to limit Seleucia's privileges failed, Parthian kings began founding other cities meant to compete with it and diminish its economic position. It was with such a scheme in mind that Vologases I set up the city of Vologesias. Such foundations, located along Mesopotamia's main trade routes, were intended to capture as great a share of business as possible, to the detriment of Seleucia. Source records from the first and second centuries ce confirm that the Arsacids were largely successful in achieving their purpose. Seleucia on the Tigris was taken a further few pegs down by the Romans, who three times in the second century ce captured and plundered it, inflicting heavy damage to its material substance and debilitating the Greeks to the advantage of the Oriental element.

Sources have little to say about the place of Jews in the Arsacid Empire. Jewish subjects of Parthian kings were the descendants of Judeans deported to Mesopotamia in 587 bce. Although Persian rulers allowed them to return to their native land, a considerable group decided to stay in the new country. As to the size of the Jewish population of the Arsacid Empire, it is clear that they were far less numerous than Parthian Greeks. Jews, like Greeks, inhabited urban as well as rural areas. Rivalries for rights in the cities sometimes led the two nationalities to conflict. Any such tensions were skillfully taken advantage of by the Parthian authorities, who, in showing favor to the Jews, hoped for their support in clashes with other ethnic minorities, especially with the Greeks. There were also other, political reasons that the Jews readily cooperated with the Arsacids. They perceived them as the only power capable of standing against Rome, and pinned on Parthia their hopes of regaining the independent statehood they lost in 63 bce when Rome annexed Syria, subordinating Judea in the process. This attitude explains why Jews rose against Rome during Trajan's campaign, largely contributing to its failure.

In return for their loyalty, the Jewish population obtained the right to have a government of its own. Moreover, the Arsacids readily offered shelter to Jews fleeing Roman rule. Such favorable attitudes were conducive to the growth of the Jewish community. Thus, after the Romans demolished the temple at Jerusalem in 70 ce, Parthian Mesopotamia became an important center of Judaic tradition.

Culture

Any attempt to characterize the Parthian culture encounters numerous problems, arising out of the variety of elements that constituted it and also from the fact that cultural phenomena in respective lands in the Arsacid Empire are known in varying (p. 185) degrees. For many years, the main problem that caused disputes among scholars was defining the characteristics of Parthian art. Such a difficulty arose because attempts at a definition were made based primarily on relics discovered outside the native Parthian areas in centers that were merely in the Parthian orbit of influence, Palmyra, Dura-Europos, Hatra, and Assur. Based on such finds, the Parthian art was declared to be spiritualist, hieratic, linear, verist, and frontal. Discoveries at Old and New Nisa, as well as in Anatolia, Central Asia, Iran, and Afghanistan, obliged scholars to revise some earlier opinions. More important than strictly formal criteria, it became necessary to define the principal components of this art. Regarding it from this angle, it became possible to indicate at least three major ones: Greek (Hellenistic), Iranian derived from Achaemenid traditions, and Iranian associated with the world of nomads from which the Parthians’ ancestors, the Parni, had descended. Still, significant regional differences were observed in the proportions in which these constituents occurred. Depending on which of them prevailed in a given area, it was accentuated in the style and character of works created there.

The most outstanding relicts of Parthian art known today come from excavations at Old and New Nisa, where archeologists have discovered not only exceptionally valuable works of art (ivory rhytons, marble sculptures, terracotta statues, richly decorated metal utensils) but also imposing remains of palatial and residential architecture. Research conducted in Turkmenistan, ancient Hyrcania, and Khuzistan has revealed many remains of Parthian religious and residential architecture, especially in small towns and medium-sized cities, and also in rural settlements. The temples of Hatra occupy a place all their own among Parthia's historical monuments.

Rock reliefs, found mainly in Elymais, are deemed characteristic of Parthian art. Dating back to Achaemenid traditions, they are considered a precious historical source, as figures are usually accompanied by inscriptions. Representative examples of Parthian sculpture are statues of Hatra and a metal figure of a ruler found at Shami.

Just as material culture offered rich variety, so did forms of intellectual life. Sources permit us to state that Arsacid tolerance enabled respective ethnic groups under their rule to freely develop their cultures. Greeks inhabiting Babylon late in the second century bce lived according to native social, cultural, and religious traditions; they frequented the theater and the gymnasium, met at the agora, and experienced the enthusiasms of sports events. They could listen to the philosophical lectures of the stoic Archedemus in his own school. Greek men of letters under the Arsacid scepter included the geographer Isidore of Charax and historians Agathocles of Babylon and Apollodorus of Artemita. Nor did Greek culture benefit Greeks alone. Classical Greek literature was known and perused at the Arsacid court as well. The Greek language was among the most widely used in the Parthian empire, including at the royal chancery.

One phenomenon that well illustrates the cultural wealth of the Arsacid state was the functioning of old religious centers in Babylonia. They were exceptional not so much in the vitality of the cultic practices performed in them to the land's deities (p. 186) as in astronomical diaries recorded in cuneiform writing, uninterrupted from the creation of the Neo-Babylonian state. The last preserved records come from the first century bce.


What with local differences and the variety of its forms, content, and inspirations, Parthian culture evades any attempts at a simple, unambiguous classification. It faithfully reflected the nature of the empire of the Arsacids, who united under their scepter a great many peoples, but never managed—or wanted—to impose on them a uniform style and model of culture, which enabled those ethnic groups to maintain their own identities and allowed them to pursue their native cultural traditions.